

## Geopolitics

A: ġugrāfiyā siyāsīya. – F: géopolitique. –

G: geopolitik. – R: geopolitika. S: geopolítica. –

C: diyuan zhengzhixue. 地缘政治学

The term ‘geopolitics’ was formalised by the Swedish constitutional lawyer Rudolf **Kjellén** (1864–1922) and systematically developed and raised to a doctrine of international relations by Karl **Haushofer** (1869–1946) during the period of Europe’s intensifying interstate rivalries after the turn of the century. It had the objective of emphasising the primary determination of the political by space. Since the 1970s, it is supposed to capture in its formally neutralised version ‘power struggles over territories for the purpose of political control over space’ (**Lacoste** 1993).

Cross-nationally, the concept entails three core elements: a bio-organic notion of the state, a social-Darwinist view of inter-state relations defined as a struggle for *Lebensraum* [living space], and the deduction of the political from spatio-natural determinants.

1. As set out in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* [Journal for Geopolitics], **Haushofer’s** ‘specifically German’ theory of international politics combined (i) a backward-looking critique of the liberal, ‘mechanistic’ conceptions of the state and society, counterposed to the *völkisch* ‘ideas of 1914’ and an organicist conception of the state; (ii) an instinctive rejection of technology and industry; (iii) a corresponding revaluation of pre-industrial agriculture, mystified as ‘chthonic’ and ‘organic’; (iv) a Malthusian emphasis on population growth; (v) a dualistic view of power determined by geographical position with a preference for land power over sea power, informing the programmatic policy prescriptions for the establishment of a Eurasian power bloc under German leadership; (vi) the rejection of international law, as institutionalised in the League of Nations, in favour of a new *Großraumordnung* [Grand Spatial Order]; (vii) the combination and

political radicalisation of these elements in Anglophobia and anti-Semitism. In the context of the capitalist interwar crisis, German geopolitics can best be understood as the ideology of a ‘continental German imperialism’ (**Diner** 1984, 2) and a theoretical riposte to Marxist theories of imperialism.

Between 1916 and 1944, the concept of geopolitics reaches its phase of greatest public influence; first during the revisionist intellectual struggles against the Versailles Treaties and, thereafter, as a key legitimisation for national-socialist *Großraumpolitik*. The disastrous consequences of WWII led to the term’s widespread discrediting in the Federal Republic, even though the concept was not altogether taboo (**Grabowsky** 1960). Elements of the term were revived during the 1980s by conservative historians in the ‘Historians’ Controversy [*Historikerstreit*]’ in what Hans-Ulrich **Wehler** described as ‘middle position palaver [*Mittellagen Palaver*]’ (**Wehler** 1988, 224), seconded by Jürgen **Habermas** who referred to the term’s public rehabilitation as a form of ‘geopolitical ballyhoo [*Tamtam*]’ (**Habermas** 1987, 75). German unity, finally, led to a general discursive renaissance of the idiomatic vocabulary of geopolitics, even though the concept’s historical genealogy has been largely sanitised or suppressed (**Diekmann et al.** 2000).

Outside Germany and from the beginning of the Cold War onwards, German-Jewish émigrés exported geopolitical categories and ways of reasoning that crystallised in the American discourse of power-political ‘realism’. Through this transposition, geopolitical ideas with only minor conceptual re-adjustments merged in the US with an indigenous Anglo-American geopolitical tradition, most powerfully represented at the time by Isaiah **Bowman**, a key adviser to Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference (**Bowman** 1922; **Strausz-Hupé** 1942). Wilson’s moralistic liberal internationalism was strongly informed by Bowman’s new geopolitical strategy of US non-territorial

economic expansionism – a drive for ‘American global dominance’ (Gowan 2004, 161). With the post-WW-II resurgence of classical realism (Morgenthau 1948) and its Cold-War-driven transformation into neo-realism (Waltz 1979) – which insists on a systemic logic of an international state of nature in which *Realpolitik*, security dilemma and balance of power theory prevail – the realist tradition asserts itself as a hegemonic discourse of international politics to this very day (Gray 1988; Kissinger 1994; Mearsheimer 2001). In Latin countries, the *nouvelle géopolitique* (Lacoste 1993) is propagated with reference to the *géohistoire* of the Annales School (Braudel 1994). It attributes primacy to the pre-social conditions of political life, especially to its natural-infrastructureal (geographical, geological and topological) premises as manifestations of *la longue durée*. It led to the foundation of geopolitical journals in France (*Hérodote*) and Italy (*liMes – Rivista Italiana die Geopolitica*). Since the 1980s, critical geopolitics (Ashley 1987; Walker 1993; George 1994; Agnew/Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Agnew 1998), especially in its poststructuralist form, attempts to understand geopolitics as a discursive inside/outside phenomenon by exploring the social constructedness of spatial political orders on the basis of historicised readings of territorial transformations. Even though the intellectual links between some of these contemporary strands of geopolitical thought and the original German tradition are tenuous, invocations of the term geopolitics have become once again central to the wider discourse in academia and beyond.

2. Elements of the geopolitical tradition of thought can be traced back to the political philosophies of the physiocrats and bourgeois materialists. Political naturalism, which originates from there, can be divided into a biological-racial doctrine of human nature and a geographical-determinist doctrine (climate, soil, location, topography) in relation to non-human nature. Both are crucial for determining the regionally specific form of political socialisation. Against the background of the foundation of the German Empire (1871) after the Wars of Unification and the subsequent period of inter-imperialist rivalries, Friedrich Ratzel (1846–1911) first

developed the critique of the universalistic notion of the state associated with the Enlightenment and liberalism (Faber 1982). Ratzel, a co-founder of the *Alldeutscher Verband* (Pan-German League), fused the organic-state conception with the social Darwinism of Ernst Haeckel (1843–1909) into ‘the law of spatial expansion’ (Ratzel 1882, 116 et sqq.). The struggle for survival, operative in fauna and flora, transforms into a collective struggle for space and resources amongst *Völker* [racially/culturally defined peoples]. This struggle for space revolves around expansion and selection, rather than specialisation. The notion of a mismatch between soil fertility and population growth (Ratzel 1897, 74 et sqq.), grounded in a precapitalist agrarian worldview, justifies expansionist policies. *Großraum* turns into *Lebensraum* (Ratzel 1901) and, therefore, into the ‘natural’ objective of any state activity. War is regarded as the natural and decisive mode of geopolitical regulation between organic collectives. States are born, grow and die in the struggle for space. Categories that mediate between the notions of soil, society and state – such as labour, classes and social interests – are largely sidelined. Consequently, differences arise in the prewar era between ethnocentric (Oscar Peschel, Robert Sieger) and geopolitical views of the goals and limits of foreign policy. While the former conception relies on political romanticism and Herder’s notion of nations as cultural-linguistic units [*Volksnation*], leading to a self-limiting territorial correspondence between a nation’s area of settlement and the scale of state territory, the latter conception [*Staatsnation*] prioritises infinite territorial aggrandisement over ethnic-racial homogeneity (Ratzel, Alfred Kirchhoff), although it may also involve an active policy of ethnic settlement (Germanicisation). *Volksnation* and *Staatsnation* are, thus, not synonymous and constitute rival points of reference (cf. Faber 1982, 394 et sqq.). This tension between ‘race’ and ‘space’ re-emerges later in discrepancies between the original programme of German geopolitics and Adolf Hitler’s *Rassenideologie* [racial ideology] (cf. Bassin 1987).

Contemporaneously and in partial competition with these developments in prewar Germany, Alfred T. Mahan’s (1840–1914)

anti-isolationist navalism and Halford **Mackinder's** (1861–1947) heartland-theory form the core of a recognisable geopolitical tradition in the US and Britain. Admiral **Mahan's** 'aquatological' theory (1890; 1897) identifies the decisive factor in power politics in the fleet-based domination of the sea, whereas **Mackinder** – at the time Director of the London School of Economics – insists on the superiority of territorial power in what he describes as the 'post-Columbian', i.e. post-naval, age (**Mackinder** 1904). Both conceptions express the factual transition from the cosmopolitan imperialism of free trade to the era of protectionist neo-mercantilism (**Semmel** 1960, 171 et sqq.). According to **Mackinder's** 'trizonal' world-view, a geostrategically immune inner-Eurasian heartland – the pivot of history – is enclosed by an inner crescent that stretches from the margins of Europe over the Near and Middle East on to India and China. This is, in turn, surrounded by an outer crescent, which comprises England, the Americas, Africa, Australia, Oceania and Japan. Whilst control of the world's oceans had been the decisive factor in the power constellations of the 'Columbian' age (ca. 1500–1900), the contemporary global balance of power is decisively altered by the technological penetration of the *pivot area* (Central Asia, Russia) by a transcontinental network of railways. The future belonged to an alliance between Germany and Russia, which remained in its territorial heartland immune against the sea powers. Only a grand coalition of sea powers against the territorial powers could prevent the otherwise certain Eurasian world domination (1904, 436). 'Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-island: Who commands the World-island commands the World' (1919, 150). The horizon of this vision is 'world domination'.

It is doubtful, however, whether **Mackinder** and **Mahan** form part of an 'Anglo-Saxon democratic' tradition of geopolitics (**Sprengel** 1996, 25). Both emphasise the 'struggle for existence', both subscribe to the organicist view of the state. **Mackinder** pleads for a social-imperialist policy of race and education and demands the subordination of the demands of the people under the imperatives of what he describes as militarised imperialist

trading states (1919; cf. **Semmel** 1960, 174 et sqq.). His dichotomous categories – land/sea, tellurian/aquatological, Leviathan/Behemoth – are later adopted by Carl **Schmitt** (1950).

3. As a practice-oriented theory of space, geopolitics matures from 1933 onwards into the official German science of the state [*Staatswissenschaft*]. Next to **Ratzel's** political geography, the German geopolitical tradition was most directly influenced by **Kjellén's** anti-legalistic writings on constitutional and international law. In *Der Staat als Lebensform* [*The State as an Organism*, 1917], **Kjellén** contrasts the norm-oriented legal positivism, most notably represented in Weimar Germany by the Austrian-Jewish constitutional jurist **Hans Kelsen** (1934) and the German jurist **Georg Jellinek** (1922), with what he calls an 'empirical viewpoint' of the state. Here, geopolitics is defined as 'a view of the state as geographic organism' or as a 'phenomenon in space' [*Erscheinung im Raume*; **Kjellén**, 45]. In this conception, geopolitics constitutes one, though central, component of politics in general. Driven by this vitalistic view of the state defined primarily as a power-political actor and its concomitant elevation of foreign policy to an existential condition, geopolitics turns into an auxiliary science of politics in the international struggle for survival. Laws of nature provide its basis of legitimacy. 'Energetic states, whose space is limited, are compelled by the same categorical-political imperative to expand their space through colonisation, merger or conquest of various kinds' (75). During the period of transition from the nineteenth-century 'Concert of Europe', the pentarchy, to the new constellation of 'world politics' in the 'planetary age' (**Kjellén** 1918a), flanked by the US and the USSR as the new super-powers, **Kjellén's** thoughts on geopolitics received a wide reception in interwar Germany. The rise of the geopolitical discourse in the 1920s and early 1930s was marked by the foundation of the Geopolitische Seminar at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (1924) in Berlin, the launch of the high-circulation *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (1924), published by the NSDAP member Kurt **Vowinckel** and edited by **Haushofer**, **Erich Obst**, **Hermann Lautensach** and **Fritz Termer** (from 1925

Otto **Mauil**), and the creation of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Geopolitik [Working Group on Geopolitics] (1932) (**Sprenkel** 1996, 33). **Haushofer**, appointed professor for geography at the University of Munich (1921–39), president of the Deutsche Akademie (1934–7) and a close confidant of Rudolf **Hess**, defines geopolitics as ‘the science of political forms of life within living space, conceived in its deep relation to soil and conditioned by history’ (1928c, 54). Geopolitics was destined to become the ‘geographical conscience of the state’ (1928a, 27). ‘Suggestive cartography’ was hailed as a means of mass education for the collective preparation of the nation in its ‘struggle for survival on earth’ (1929d, 346). In intellectual affinity with **Ratzel**, **Haushofer** mobilises the argument of the ‘increasing discrepancy between food supplies and population density’ to justify demands for a ‘redistribution of the living and breathing space on earth according to the working capacity and cultural performance of different peoples’ (1928b, 41). Any legal recognition of consolidated borders is rejected (1934). A reasonable, law-based and negotiated resolution of conflicting international interests is declared illusory.

In attacking the ‘liberal’ system of European mini-states and the tendency to juridicise international politics and buoyed by the first foreign-policy ‘successes’ of the Nazi régime, the geopoliticians increasingly invoke during the 1930s the ‘law of growing spaces’, i.e. the idea of the permanent enlargement of state territory as part of the historical movement itself. But this new spatial order is no longer based on nineteenth-century nation-states as the constitutive units of the states system, but on *Großraum* or even ‘Empire’ (**Mauil** 1934; **Obst** 1941). In place of one universally applicable international law, Carl **Schmitt** (1939) advocates the pluralisation and regionalisation of diverse, co-existing and mutually exclusive legal spheres: *Lebensraum*, *Großraum* and Empire are the ordering terms that underpin his idea of a supranational hegemonic order in Central and Eastern Europe under German leadership, located between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers’ spheres of interest. In this, **Schmitt**

repeatedly refers to the Monroe Doctrine as one example of his new planetary vision and one of the most glaring manifestations of US double standards in international law and politics between Versailles and Geneva. **Schmitt**’s demand for a geopolitical revision of international law can be regarded as a ‘legal claim for ground-rent in the international context’ (**Diner** 1984, 23 et sqq.). **Haushofer** pleads with reference to **MacKinder**’s heartland theory for the construction of a continental bloc, comprising Germany, the USSR and Japan (1940). This conception was instrumental for legitimising both the German-Japanese Anticomintern Pact (1936) and the German-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939). The contradiction between **Haushofer**’s anti-Bolshevism and his demands for a Eurasian bloc remains, of course, irresolvable. During the late 1930s, the term geopolitics becomes increasingly re-charged with *völkisch* terms (**Sandner** 1994, 10) and is finally subordinated to racial policies (cf. **Bassin** 1987).

4. The epistemological premises of historical materialism, as articulated by **Marx** and **Engels**, stand in many ways opposed to the causal factors that the geopolitical tradition prioritises for a comprehensive understanding of the political and geopolitical as dimensions of total social reproduction. Deeply influenced by the early nineteenth-century genre of philosophies of history, space is largely eclipsed by time in their respective *œuvres*. The guiding notion of historical progress, assumed to drive every single society in its internal-domestic development, is often unproblematically extrapolated to hold for world society as a whole. However, by laying the foundations for historicising and contextualising the socio-political construction of space, foreign policy and international relations, **Marx** and **Engels** stress that nature, territory and geography cannot remain pre-social constants. They are subject to transformation in their interaction with labour (**Schmidt** 1962). Still, the founders of historical materialism do not systematically incorporate the objective problems and phenomena highlighted by the geopolitical tradition in their wider reflections. This relative absence of

the geopolitical has left a problematic legacy within Marxism (Teschke 2005).

The young **Marx** and **Engels** are still strongly influenced by the universalism of liberal theories of history and the free-trade cosmopolitanism of classical political economy, even though they reject the idea of the pacifying effect of world trade. **Marx** writes to Annenkow on 28 December 1846: 'What is the whole internal organisation of nations, what are their international relations, if not the expression of a given division of labour. And must they not change as the division of labour changes?' (MECW 34, 98). Rejecting the limits of traditional historiography 'which neglects the real relations and confines itself to spectacular historical events' (MECW 5, 50), the determination of international relations remains ambivalent. 'Bourgeois society comprises [...] the total commercial and industrial life of a particular stage and transcends in this respect each state and each nation, although it is required to represent itself externally as a nation and internally as a state' (ibid). Worldwide free trade, in turn, is thought to be a precondition for the proletarian revolution on a world scale: 'Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with them' (MECW 5, 49; modified in **Engels** in MECW 6, 312 et sqq., different in **Marx** and **Engels** in the *Manifesto*, MECW, 6, 495 passim). The problem of how states facilitate and enable circulation through their trade policies is mentioned (MECW 6, 75 passim), but not integrated into this concept of history. Similarly, **Engels** records the non-simultaneity of the nationally differentiated economic, social and political paths of development (MECW 6, 15 passim) and hopes for a shift in the European balance of power towards the progressive Western powers as a result of the bourgeois revolution in Germany. Both historical observations remain equally inconsequential for theory (MECW 6, 64). Classically, the *Manifesto* reads: 'The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. [...] In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-

sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. [...] The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilisation' (MECW 6, 487 et sqq.). The non-simultaneity and relative political resistance of regionally differentiated and institutionalised class interests within the wider frame of a territorially constituted states-system remain outside the *Manifesto's* theoretical perspective. Here, the notion of a 'simultaneous development on the world scale' prevails (Soell 1972, 112).

Beginning with the preparatory work for *Das Kapital* and influenced by the failed 1848 revolution, this initial position is problematised and finally revised, demonstrated by the planning sketches for *Das Kapital*. However, the problem as to *why* political power constitutes itself territorially in the shape of a world system of politically sovereign states, whilst the world market as the sphere of private exchange assumes a universal form, is not even formulated as a research desideratum (see working plan for the 1857 *Introduction*). Equally, inter-state relations fail to appear in the projects that would eventually remain unfinished: '(3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state. Viewed in relation to itself. The "unproductive" classes. Taxes. State debt. Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration. (4) The international relation of production. International division of labour. International exchange. Export and import. Rate of exchange. (5) The world market and crises' (MECW 28, 45 et sqq.). However, the recognition of the problems inherent in the mediation between international relations and universal history start to change in the mid 1850s. First, **Marx's** emphasis of the diachronic and regionally specific national developments, including his greater historical sensitivity to regionally differentiated forms of class struggle, crisis and revolution, raises questions about the impact of the post-revolutionary state on the inter-state system. Second, **Marx** starts to inquire into the impact of conventional inter-state wars on social structure and political

order. Third, he develops a greater appreciation of the role that multilateral diplomacy plays in stabilising the international order. These questions cannot, however, be answered in the dialectical and historically abstract format of *Capital I*. They refer to a theoretically-informed re-reading of the historical material. **Marx** and **Engels** did not, in any case, despite their growing awareness of international relations, develop an integrated theory that incorporates the historical efficacy of international relations into their conception of the overall course of world history. Their interest in geopolitics remains primarily tied to the tactical consequences of alterations in world politics for communist strategy and, hence, limited to very perceptive but primarily *ad hoc* interventions of a journalistic or party-political character.

During the 1848 revolutions, **Marx** and **Engels** assumed the outbreak of revolutionary wars between a democratic and united Germany and late-absolutist states (Denmark, Russia, Austria). This would divide Europe into a revolutionary and a counter-revolutionary camp (*MECW* 7, 115, 212, 352, 421). The anticipated internationalisation of the revolution is thought to be carried out by a 'world war' (*MECW* 7, 505; *MECW* 8, 215; *MECW* 9 148 et sqq., 197 et sqq., *MECW* 6, 463) between the ideals of freedom and despotism. This raises the problem of the role that England – according to **Marx** the 'rock against which the revolutionary waves break' – is supposed to play. He confidently expects a defeat of England at the hands of a revolutionary and proletarian France (*MECW* 8, 214).

After the failure of 1848, **Marx** and **Engels** invert the nexus revolution-war into the nexus war-revolution during the 1850s and 1860s. Ruptures in the social and political fabric, especially in the defeated countries, are now expected after each war (*MECW* 12, 107, 174, 227). Still, **Marx's** polemic against Palmerston's secret diplomacy (*MECW* 39, 395; *MECW* 10, 510 et sqq.), which helped to preserve Tsarist Russia despite its defeat in the Crimean War due to British balance of power considerations, suggests that he strongly underestimated the whole sphere of diplomacy and alliance systems, i.e. the

conscious and multilateral regulation of great-power relations. 'We had neglected this issue [foreign policy] too much' (*MECW* 39, 395), **Marx** himself concedes. Subsequent reflections on world politics by **Marx** and **Engels** are characterised by their concern about securing the future of a united Germany. Especially **Engels** demonstrates strategic prescience by foreseeing Germany's emerging dual-front problem, anticipating, in fact, the Schlieffen Plan strategy (*MECW* 16, 239). He suggests a 'speculative separation' of the 'separate field of foreign policy [...] from domestic politics'. This may mean that what appears to be 'subjectively reactionary' can function as 'objectively revolutionary in foreign policy' (letter to **Marx**, 31 May 1860, *MECW* 41, 142).

Despite the fact that the European wars between 1853 and 1870 (with the exception of the Paris Commune) did not generate the expected outcomes, theoretically much more fundamental questions arise regarding the explanation of the origins of war, how to conceive of war, and how to integrate the consequences of war as critical junctures in the wider course of history. Even though **Marx** is clearly aware of the broader *problématique* of international relations, the logic of international and national class struggles is not persuasively mediated with the logic of inter-state competition in the context of the inter-state system. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* he writes: 'It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organise itself at home *as a class* and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle – insofar as its class struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the *Communist Manifesto* says, "in form". But the "framework of the present-day national state", for instance, the German Empire, is itself, in its turn, economically "within the framework" of the world market, politically "within the framework" of the system of states. Every businessman knows that German trade is at the same time foreign trade, and the greatness of Herr Bismarck consists, to be sure, precisely in his pursuing a kind of *international policy*' (*MECW* 6, 487 et sqq.). **Engels** was certainly willing to grant foreign policy transitory primacy in the context of

inter-state relations. From a military-political point of view he argues: 'The military strength required by a Great Power is not to be measured with a view to the greater or smaller likelihood of a coup d'état but according to the size of the army of other great powers' (MECW 20, 61).

5. As a 'national *Staatswissenschaft* [science of the state]' geopolitics distinguishes itself from Marxism as well as from liberal notions of the state (*Denkschrift* 1933). Conversely, the classical geopolitical tradition is criticised by Marxism. Karl August **Wittfogel's** critique of the **Kautsky** disciple Georg Engelbert **Graf**, who charged **Marx** with having 'neglected the primary, natural facts' (1919, 29, cf. 1924), forms the climax of this controversy. **Wittfogel** primarily explores the epistemological difference between geopolitics and Marxism: 'Geographical factors do not directly impact on politics [. . .]; it is only within the process of production that these "primary, intrinsically natural elements" (**Graf**) assert themselves, either as the underlying fundamental, natural conditions or as productive forces. Yet, even then, their impact is not a direct one. It is only through the specific social order as it is derived from the production process that the natural conditions influence the development of political life' (1929, 22). Heinrich **Cunow** (1921, 167) criticises **Ratzel's** concept in a similar fashion. According to Karl **Korsch**, German *Geopolitik* represents 'the expression as well as the weapon of a desperate attempt to solve the revolutionary problems of our times [. . .] through the cataclysm of a world-wide counter-revolution' (1943, 14). For Günter **Heyden**, it is 'a pseudo-scientific product of the imperialist stage of capitalist development' (1958, 483).

Observing the one-sided and non-dialectical emphasis that geopolitical doctrine imparts to soil, space and power cannot obscure the neglect with which the official Marxisms of the Second and Third International treated the implications of the territorial distribution of state power. They gave preference to the category of time, which was perceived to be historically universal, over the category of space, which was socio-politically differentiated and

simultaneously geographically co-determined. Here, the development of humanity was conceptualised in terms of one universal and unilinear society, abstracted from all geographical and international contexts. The intellectual tracks for this 'history without geopolitics' were already laid by the founders of historical materialism themselves.

Since the 1970s, works inspired by world-systems theory and neo-Gramscianism try to re-synthesise reproductive strategies, territoriality and world politics. The former (**Wallerstein** 1974) focus primarily on the relation between metropolis and periphery constituted by the division of labour and reproduced by unequal circulation; the latter group (**Cox** 1987, 1996, **Gill** 1990, 1993, **Rupert** 1994, 2000) conceptualises the relation between labour régimes, ideology-construction and hegemonic block. A further group (**Rosenberg** 1994, **van der Pijl** 1998, **Bromley** 1999, **Teschke** 2003, 2005) seeks a new interpretation of the critique of political economy with the objective of developing an alternative universal-historical perspective on the socially uneven and geopolitically combined real development of the regionally differentiated course of history.

**Luttwak** sees the old geopolitics replaced by the dominance of 'geoeconomics' in the context of globalisation – intensified global competition would lead in the long run to a 'world economic war' (1994, 46). Triadisation, the formation of regional block, is one answer by states to economic globalisation (**Link** 1998, 79). However, the dynamic of continental bloc formation does not prevail over the increased integration amongst Triad centres, which renders the intensification of inter-imperialist tensions unlikely (**Alnasser** et al. 2001, 38). **Altvater** and **Mahnkopf** suggest that this 'militaristic peace [. . .] can surely only hold as long as shared interests prevail' (1996, 37). In this new constellation of globalisation the state becomes 'predominantly a geo-economic player and only in the second place a player within the system of international politics' (66).

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certainty, colonialism, composition plans, dependency theory, earth, empire, Eurocentrism, formation theory, globalisation, international, international relations, Kautskyanism, Malthusianism, Marxism, materialism (geographical), Monroe doctrine, neo-colonialism, Occidentalism, Paris Commune, periphery/centre, population theory, politics, relations of intercourse, secret diplomacy, space, theory of social development, time, trade, universal history, war and peace, world war, world system

Aufbaupläne, Dependenztheorie, Erde, Eurozentrismus, Formationstheorie, Geheimdiplomatie,